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Scholars in different academic fields follow different modes of writing across disciplines and 
fields of study. In short, what makes perfectly decent scholarly writing in chemistry might be 
regarded as grossly out of place in political philosophy. Yet, it would be an exaggeration to 
argue that there could not be significant similarities when it comes to the academic texts 
produced by scholars. For instance, there are clear structural similarities in academic research 
texts; it is commonplace to start with an introduction and to end with a conclusion. However, 
it would be a mistake to assume that even within a certain field or discipline, all of the 
authors would write in a similar style. Perhaps a leopard cannot change its spots, but not all 
leopards are similar. 
 
Accordingly, in law as an academic discipline there are different styles of writing depending 
on the subfield and purpose of the text. Legal historians, legal philosophers, doctrinalists or 
comparatists tend to compose their texts by using different styles. Also, the purpose of a text 
is a meaningful factor because a vivid and heavily theory-laden style may work wonderfully 
in, for example, a legal theoretical or law and literature type of an analysis, whereas using a 
similar style in a doctrinal introductory textbook would quite likely end in an epic failure. For 
                                                             
1  ‘πολὐ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι’, Ἀριστοτέλης, Περὶ ποιητικῆς, 1459a, ‘Aristotelis De arte poetica liber’, 
in Rudolf Kassel (ed) Oxford Classical Texts (Oxonii (Oxford), E Typographeo Clarendoniano (Clarendon 
Press) 1965) (source: Perseus Digital Library, http://perseus.tufts.edu). For Aristotle, being a master of metaphor 
was something that cannot be learnt from others and, moreover, it is also a sign of literary genius. 
this reason, a metaphor loving doctrinalist might soon end up having a rather limited 
readership indeed. 
 
In the same fashion, comparative law as an academic discipline seems to have its own 
conventions when it comes to composing different scholarly texts. Consequently, some of the 
authors have followed the conventions of doctrinal legal writing, whereas others have been 
influenced by other disciplines like historiography, philosophy or economics.2 One curious 
feature in comparative law language, used by some but certainly not by all scholars, has been 
the use of metaphors to express ideas, findings and conclusions. But what actually is a 
metaphor, and how well does it fit into academic comparative law? According to the OED, a 
metaphor is ‘a figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred 
to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable’.3  
 
In my view, there is a reason why comparatists in particular use metaphors in their writing. 
This reason is found, it will be argued in this paper, in the comparative nature of the research. 
In essence, metaphor is a comparison between two things; so it is based on resemblance or 
similarity of certain qualities without using ‘like’ or ‘as’. In other words, metaphor is not 
merely a rhetorical device belonging to certain comparatists’ personal writing style, but it is 
an intrinsic part of the attempt to think comparatively. In essence, as defined by Kenneth 
Burke, metaphor is a ‘device for seeing something in terms of something else’.4 And, 
importantly, comparatists always see something else, i.e. foreign laws and legal cultures that 
are different than their own.5 
 
This brief paper discusses the use of metaphor in comparative law by looking at an example 
from macro-comparative law by Esin Örücü, who has used culinary terms as metaphors while 
discussing mixed legal systems. The purpose of the following analysis is to illustrate 
                                                             
2 For example, texts from Gunter Frankenberg or Pierre Legrand are also stylistically very different from the 
texts of Rodolfo Sacco or Reinhard Zimmermann. 
3 Oxford University Press, ‘Metaphor’ (OED Online March 2016). 
⟨www.oed.com/view/Entry/117328?redirectedFrom=metaphor⟩ accessed 22 April 2016. Of course, this 
definition basically relies on Aristotle’s definition from Poetics (1457b): ‘metaphor is the application of a 
strange term’ (‘μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ’). 
4 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, University of California Press 1969) 503. 
5 Finn Makela speaks of domain mapping, which refers to the fact that metaphors should be seen as speech acts 
that propose a hypothesis of similarity between two separate domains, see Finn Makela, ‘Metaphors and Models 
in  Legal Theory’ (2011) 52 Les Cahiers de droit 397. 
particular epistemic benefits of using metaphors in comparative legal literature. Accordingly, 
it will be argued that metaphors have a special place especially in comparative law literature.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: after this short introduction (section 1), the context of 
macro-comparative law is explained (section 2). This is followed by a concrete example of 
metaphorical conceptualisation concerning mixed legal systems (section 3). The final part 
(section 4) contains a theoretical conclusion on the use of metaphors in macro-comparative 
law. 
 
2 About macro-comparative law 
 
In the theory of comparative law, law groups, legal families, legal cultures and legal 
traditions are frequently discussed.6 Such classifications mainly refer to whole systems, and 
they represent what is called macro-comparison. Other comparative typologies with a lower 
abstraction level are built around different substantive sectors of law, like, for example, in 
comparative constitutional study where as a result of comparison different typologies of 
models for controlling the constitutionality of laws can be presented. Now, when constructing 
legal families, the comparatist tries to illustrate the general nature of legal cultural 
phenomena and the reasons for their manifestations. This is how we classify legal systems 
into Roman-Germanic (civil law) or common law systems, or how we regard Nordic law as a 
separate legal family that is legal-culturally closer to the legal cultural sphere of civil law 
rather than common law.7 So, in essence, legal families or other macro-constructs are 
conceptual and theoretical tools for outlining the core content of a foreign legal system in a 
very broad and generalising manner.8  
 
In macro-comparison, contrasting takes place between legal systems or even between legal 
families. Accordingly, the levels of abstraction and generalisation are both very high. Macro-
comparison does not concentrate on individual legal rules, cases, institutions or concrete 
problems and the ways to solve them. Comparison may, for example, be aimed at issues that 
concern legislative methods, the style of writing provisions, the systematisation and division 
                                                             
6 About the distinction between micro-comparison and micro-comparison see, eg, Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford, 2 edn, Oxford University Press 1998) 4-5. 
7 Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2015) 25. 
8 ibid 225-229. 
of the different fields of law and the doctrine of legal sources, or even the style of entire legal 
systems, i.e. legal cultural features characteristic of them.9 Today, the two most important and 
virtually overarching legal families are civil law and common law.10 However, not all 
systems can be classified as civil law or common law and this poses an epistemic challenge 
for macro-comparatists. This challenge is caused by hybridity, which in this case refers to a 
mixture of different elements resulting in a mixed composition of rules, principles and 
institutions whose elements are derived from different legal families.11  
 
To clarify the above, mixed legal systems (or hybrid legal systems) refer to systems that 
simultaneously contain key-characteristics of other legal families. Reasons for hybridity are 
always related to legal history, yet, each legal system has had different routes to hybridity. 
For example, together with British imperialism, common law spread also to areas where other 
types of law (indigenous, traditional and religious) had earlier been used. If the law that had 
preceded common law was legal-culturally strong, little by little systems were formed where 
there were features of both local law and common law. In some well-known cases, like 
Louisiana and Quebec, mixed systems are mixes between civil law and common law. Unlike 
in the past, mixed legal systems are nowadays seen by some as an independent legal family, 
which are by no means dying out and which are legal-culturally equal to common law and 
civil law.12 The best example of this novel epistemic move can be seen in the book edited by 
Vernon V. Palmer called Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide.13 According to Palmer, the third 
legal family is ‘conceived for purposes of convenience, utility, and explanatory power’ and it 
can be used ‘only if it provides better insights than comparative analysis has provided in the 
past’.14 In any case, for macro-comparative law, legal-cultural hybridity remains a problem of 
classification even though the phenomenon itself is hardly any novelty.15  
 
                                                             
9 ibid 102. 
10 See, eg, Thomas Lundmark, Charting the Divide between Common and Civil Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2012). 
11 See Seán Patrick Donlan, ‘Comparative Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions - an Introduction’, in Eleanor 
Cashin-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan, and Martin Sychold (eds), Comparative Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions  
(Lausanne, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, 2010) 9-18 (arguing that hybridity challenges legal nationalism, 
positivism, centralism, and monism which are all part of the legal families approach). 
12 Husa (n 7) 215. 
13 Vernon Valentine Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family (Cambridge, 2 edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012).  
14 Palmer, ‘Introduction to the mixed jurisdictions’ in ibid 16. 
15 See also Lundmark (n 10) 33-38 (discusses legal families and takes into account mixed legal systems). For an 
interesting discussion about legal history and hybridity, see Seán Patrick Donlan, ‘Remembering: Legal 
Hybridity and Legal History’ (2011) 2 Comparative Law Review 1 (pointing out that there are no pure types) 
The oldest of the classical mixed systems is probably that of Scotland because it was 
independent for a long time before it formed a Union named Great Britain (1707) with 
England and Wales Scotland had had connections with Continental law and, thus, assumed 
many Roman law/ius commune influences. Also, in the law of the province of Quebec in 
Canada there are similar features of mixed legal systems where common law has mixed with 
the civil law elements implanted earlier: branches like property law and civil law are of a 
French civil law type, but public law and criminal law are of a common law type. Besides, in 
Africa, common law has mixed with the customary law of the tribes and in Asia with a legal 
tradition that could, due to its cultural main features, be characterised as Confucian.16 Thus, 
there are many kinds of legal cultural hybridities and resulting legal pluralism. 
 
In the same way, there are systems that belong to the family of Continental European law, for 
example in Latin America, Africa and Asia, where civil law has intermingled with common 
law. Crucially, European systems are these days so close to each other due to the European 
Union (EU) that some comparatists classify the EU law as a kind of mixed law containing 
elements from national systems (common law, civil law) mixed with public international law 
and sui generis EU elements.17 In comparative law view, the EU legal system is not a unitary 
entity but consists of different legal cultural elements, and in this sense it is a hybrid and 
needs to be studied as such.18 
 
Some of the former socialist countries, too, are as a matter of fact in a state of mixed law 
although in Europe they mainly belong to the sphere of civil law.19 For example, Czech law is 
legal-culturally a complicated entity where remnants of socialist law (itself a Marxist variant 
of civil law) are still to be found in civil law, labour law and family law. On the other hand, 
in the Czech system commercial law is clearly Romano-Germanic. The earlier Czech picture 
has been further mixed by later legal loans from Western law and, due to this, the system is 
systematically fragmented and contains certain inconsistencies. Today, it is part of the EU, 
which has a huge impact on the law and legal culture of the Czech Republic.20 Because of all 
                                                             
16 See, eg, Patrick H Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford, 5 edn, Oxford 
University Press 2014) ch 9. 
17 See, eg, Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (London, 2 edn, Cavendish 1999) ch 5. 
18 cf Paul James Cardwell and Tamara Hervey, ‘Bringing in the Technical into the Socio-Legal’ in David 
Cowan and Daniel Wincott (eds), Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies (London, Palgrave 2016) 157-
182; 166. 
19 Husa (n 7) 216. 
20 See Bohumil Havel, ‘The Czech Republic’ in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar Publications 2012) 279-285. 
these reasons, it is difficult for the macro-comparatist to generalise and conceptualise systems 
that are mixed or undergoing a process of transformation from one legal family to another.21 
 
To continue the above discussion, further examples of hybrids or mixed systems are South 
Africa where common law and Roman-Dutch law are combined and Malta that combines 
common law and Italian Continental law. Similar examples are the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico, both of which combine law of Spanish origin with common law. In addition, in practice 
also all Islamic systems are hybrids mixing Western, local and Muslim ingredients.22 Now, 
the purpose of this section is not to exhaustively list mixed legal systems but, rather, to 
provide an illustrative overview of various types of mixed legal systems so that the 
difficulties of macro-comparison become visible.  As shown above, there are various 
mixtures and hybridities when it comes to the legal systems of the world. Nevertheless, it 
may be useful to note that the condition of being ‘mixed law’ or ‘hybrid law’ is not 
necessarily immutable, but there are differences between systems: some systems seem able to 
retain their constituent mixité, whereas others have a more endangered status as hybrid 
systems. These potential future developments are well presented and discussed in the recent 
book titled A Study of Mixed Systems.23 Correspondingly, the world of law is plural and this 
unorthodox plurality poses an epistemic problem for those who try to generalise and describe 
legal systems from the perspective of macro-comparison. 
 
On the whole, different ingredients are mixed into different legal pluralistic entities 
depending on local applications and historical paths, like for instance colonialism. What 
results is normally a mix between various cultural ingredients combining Western and Non-
Western, modern and traditional, religious and secular. Thus, for macro-comparative law 
these systems are epistemologically problematic because they are hard to conceptualise using 
vocabulary that is originally based on the distinction between civil law and common law. 
Hence, this is where metaphorical conceptualisation may become a useful tool as we will see 
in the following section. 
 
                                                             
21 Simply, in many cases the macro-comparatist uses crude determining factors when systematising the legal 
systems of the world. A key factor has traditionally been the ‘fact that common law systems accept judge-made 
law as a source of law’ (Lundmark (n 10) 49). 
22 See, eg, Farid S Shuaib, ‘The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia’ (2012) 21 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
85. 
23 Sue Farran, Esin Örücü and Seán Patrick Donlan (eds), A Study of Mixed Systems: Endangered, Entrenched 
or Blended (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing 2014). 
 
 
3 Mixed legal systems and culinary metaphor 
 
It is important to realise that whatever one thinks of the classification of the world’s legal 
systems and especially of mixed-legal systems it is an undeniable fact that some systems are 
hybrid as to their legal cultural nature. There is hybridity that cannot be explained away; 
some systems just are hybrid as to their nature. Typically these systems are more complex 
mixes than what is the case with the European mixes. For example, Morocco’s system 
follows structurally and institutionally French models, yet its family law has modified but 
clear Islamic features.24 Or, to take another example, Mauritius’ legal system has structurally 
and institutionally heavy British influences, whereas its civil law follows French models (the 
Code Napoleon, ie Code Civil) and there are also customary law elements included.25 And, 
this specific quality of hybridity makes them difficult to conceptualise in a standard 
comparative law language in a compelling and handy manner. Simply, we seem to have 
rather poorly fitting words (statutory law, case law, religious law, customary law etc) for the 
task. The reasons for this terminological inadequacy are not difficult to grasp. 
 
Normally, a mixed legal system is the result of the transmigration of law and the outcome a 
mismatch between the recipient and the original model. In the resultant, ie the hybrid legal 
system, diverse legal elements co-exist simultaneously.26 And, therein lies the problem for 
macro-level description. Mixed ingredients are hard to generalise about and, furthermore, 
they are in a constant state of flux between differing legal cultural enticements. All this does 
not make it easy for a macro-comparatist to conceptualise mixed systems in a general and 
understandable manner. In brief, the question is this: how can we descriptively explain mixed 
systems in a concise and understandable manner? One possible answer is to rely on 
metaphorical conceptualisation; the usage of metaphor may open up new ways of 
understanding and studying various legal mixtures.27 
 
                                                             
24 See, eg, Katie Zoglin, ‘Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women’ (2009) 31 Human Rights 
Quarterly 964. 
25 See, eg, AH Angelo, ‘Mauritius: The Basis of the Legal System’ (1970) 3 Comparative and International 
Law Journal of Southern Africa 228. 
26 Esin Örücü, ‘Law as Transposition’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 205, 212. 
27 This point is also made by Cardwell and Hervey (n 17) 164 in the context of EU law. 
Basically, the problem of macro-comparative law’s mainstream approach is that its 
presentations of mixed legal systems are not very imaginative, and they lack certain 
intellectual appeal and gravity. Anyone who reads comparative law literature soon finds out 
that mixed legal systems are kind of a remainder of an attempt to classify and characterise the 
world’s legal systems from a macro-comparative viewpoint. For these reasons, Örücü’s 
discussion of mixed legal systems through the use of culinary metaphors is particularly 
interesting because they simplify an otherwise tremendously complicated subject matter. 
Regardless of complexity, these metaphors give an instant feeling of being spot on because 
they convey an intuitively proper general mental image. In other words, they tell a story of a 
legal system with a minimal amount of words. Hence, metaphor is a narrative compressed 
into a linguistically minimal space. Moreover, it would seem, the use of culinary metaphor 
makes this kind of macro-comparative law analysis more personal and memorable. And, no 
doubt, also intellectually more appealing to many readers who are jaded with boring and dull 
descriptive macro-comparative law texts focusing on positive laws and the so-called Great 
legal families.28 It is almost needless to say that comparative law literature is filled with 
common-law-this and civil-law-that discussions and descriptions. Metaphor may be a way 
out. 
 
Basically, Örücü has distinguished between four different kinds of mixed legal systems 
which are: 1) mixing bowl systems where distinct elements are integrated within similar legal 
institutions, 2) salad bowl systems where both legal elements and institutions are distinct, 3) 
salad plate systems where there is legal dualism or pluralism and 4) purée systems where 
legal traditions that form the basis for legal elements and institutions have become genuinely 
blended.29 This metaphorical structure uses the level of integration as the foundation: at one 
end there is a mixing bowl where legal elements are interacting but not totally blended, at the 
other end there is a purée where legal elements are truly fused together making it difficult to 
distinguish between them. In practice, however, most mixed systems are situated somewhere 
in between these extreme ends. 
 
                                                             
28 For a recent discussion of legal families see Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Rise and Decline of Legal Families' 
(2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 1043 and Jaakko Husa, ‘The Future of Legal Families' 
(Oxford Handbooks Online May 2016) DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.013.26 
29 Örücü (n 25) 213. For more detailed earlier discussion, see Esin Örücü, ‘Mixed and Mixing: A Conceptual 
Approach’, in Esin Örücü and Elspeth Attwooll and Sean Coyle (eds), Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and 
Mixing (The Hague, Kluwer 1996) 335-351. 
On one occasion, Örücü visualises mixed systems along a spectrum and continues by 
conceptualising her culinary mixed legal system metaphor in the following manner: 
 
When elements from socio-culturally similar and legal-culturally different legal systems 
come together forming mixed systems of the already mentioned ‘simple’ kind –  
 the ‘mixing bowls’ – the ingredients are still in the process of  blending but in need of 
further processing if a ‘purée’ is to be  produced. Next to ‘simple’ mixes come the 
‘complex’ mixed systems, where the elements are both socio-culturally and legal-
culturally different. I have called this type elsewhere the ‘Italian salad bowl’ where, 
although the salad dressing covers the salad, it is easy to detect the individual ingredients 
clearly through the side of the glass bowl. A good example of this is Algeria. Then, there 
is what I called the ‘English salad plate’, the ingredients sitting separately far apart on a 
flat plate with a blob of mayonnaise at the side into which the different ingredients can be 
dipped before consumption. Examples of this are the Sudan and Zimbabwe – legal 
pluralisms –, which lie towards the far end of the spectrum.  The examples become more 
extreme along the path, ending in ‘curdling’, with a dysfunctional legal system, as 
already mentioned.30 
 
To be sure, this is not a boring way to write about macro-comparative law. Undoubtedly, it is 
also a personal and memorable way to conceptualise legal hybridity. Albeit, the question is: 
does this kind of metaphorical composing really work? And, if it works what makes it work? 
 
As one can see from the above lengthy quote, the culinary metaphor is really about 
explaining how socio-culturally and legal-culturally different legal elements form mixed 
outcomes of various kinds. Essentially, culinary metaphors are not important as such but, 
rather, they are a means to an end. Accordingly, the macro-comparative compressed narrative 
told by the help of a metaphor transfers words describing legal elements (institutions, 
sources, processes, actors etc) into culinary ones so that ’salad bowl’ and other words enable 
the reader to conceive the described world of law in terms of dishes. But what really takes 
place here? What happens is that this metaphor actually stimulates the reader to visualise a 
mixed legal system because these non-conventional words (in a conventional legal context) 
awaken the reader’s perception into a form of imagery – mixed legal system X transforms 
into mental representation of a salad bowl of law or into a salad plate of legal institutions. In 
this process of metaphorising, the abstract macro-comparative terms and concepts become 
legal theoretical grand-scale images enabling the reader to instantly picture what they are 
                                                             
30 The quote is taken from Esin Örücü, ‘What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?’ (2008) 12 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law <www.ejcl.org/121/art121-15.pdf> accessed 24 May 2016.  
reading and also to remember and, at best, instantly conceive what they are reading.31 By the 
same token, culinary metaphor is also an allusion because it draws on sources relating to a 
kitchen or cookery, which are outside the world of law and the sphere of legal systems. 
 
For example, mentally visualising Scots law as a mixing bowl where there are distinct civil 
law and common law elements integrated with similar legal institutions, is an intellectually 
clever manner of expressing the overall state and nature of Scots law as a mixed legal system. 
In short, the whole point in this kind of use of metaphor is to create a mental image that 
enables quick understanding of a complicated thing.32 For an attempt to grasp and generalise 
hybrid systems comparatively this kind of understanding may be particularly beneficial. 
Under these circumstances, metaphor is a comparative generalisation that makes complicated 
mixed systems cognitively less complex, ie metaphorising is an act of epistemic 
simplification – something which is always crucial for macro-comparative law.33  
 
Moreover, the fact that metaphor fits so well in theoretically-oriented comparative law 
writing should not be a surprise for anyone. Along similar lines, I agree with Finn Makela 
when he claims that legal scholars who venture beyond the doctrinal study of law ‘tend to 
think of themselves as engaging in some form of social science or philosophy. As such, we 
tend to view metaphors with some suspicion’. But as he continues, metaphor may be a 
powerful methodological tool for generating new understanding.34 Moreover, we can argue 
that legal language in general is strongly metaphorical because law is ‘an abstract and 
intellectually-indeterminate idea’, and as such we need ‘to describe it in figurative words and 
phrases that evoke concrete and readily-comprehensible sensory phenomena’.35 
 
                                                             
31 This kind of understanding of a text is metaphorical as it relies on the use of non-literal meaning which is 
connected to the context of the text. So, ‘the word is always the bearer of the “emergent meaning” which 
specific contexts confer upon it’, Paul Ricoeur, in John B. Thompson (ed), Hermeneutics & the Human 
Sciences, (New York, Cambridge University Press 1995) 166. Clearly, the specific context in this case is macro-
comparative law in general and discourse on mixed legal systems in particular.  
32 I have argued elsewhere that this kind of function is an elemental part of the concept of ‘legal family’, which 
is also a metaphorical device used to conceptualise complicated things. See Jaakko Husa, ‘Family Affair – 
Comparative Law’s Never Ending Story?’ Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi (Napoli, Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiani 2014) 21-48. 
33 One could also argue that, in fact, reality is metaphorical so that metaphor forms a kind of a bridge which 
traverses the cognitive gap between the scholar and reality. See Gary Watt, ‘The Matter of Metaphor in 
Language and Law’ (2012) 6 Pólemos 49. 
34 Makela (n 5) 415. 
35 Bernard J Hibbits, ‘The Metaphor is the Message’ (1995) 22 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 
53; 53. 
Now, the culinary macro-comparative metaphor used by Örücü implies that metaphor 
functions as a methodological tool generating new understanding (ie as an act of perceiving) 
by creating mental images of different kinds of mixed legal systems.36 This kind of a 
metaphor is profoundly innovative as to its nature or what Paul Ricouer calls ‘a momentary 
creation of language…which does not have a status in the language as something already 
established’.37 Importantly, metaphors are built of creative composing that invites the reader 
along a journey of understanding (foreign law) with the author.38 In the end, metaphorical 
writing contributes to an imaginative comparative law that finds its own ways of doing 
things, and it does this without relying too much on the conceptual help from other 





As shown above, it can be concluded that metaphorical writing has merits in non-doctrinal 
comparative law writing. In an essential sense, macro-comparative culinary metaphors are 
legal theoretical images and, as noted by Maks Del Mar, these kinds of images allow 
theoretical constructions to be built, so in this sense metaphors are ‘constructive; like islands 
of belief dotting the oceans of doubt’.40 And, often comparatists are indeed sailing in an 
ocean of doubt caused by the epistemic challenges posed by hybrid legal systems. Ultimately, 
metaphors are helpful precisely because they provide islands of belief but also, crucially, they 
provide points of understanding – making cognitively sense of foreign legal systems and 
legal hybridities.41 This core task of making sense of the foreign lies at the heart of 
comparative law as an academic discipline. 
                                                             
36 However, metaphorical language can also be used in a doctrinal sense so that it frames ‘the world in ways 
which are presented as unquestionable’ as has been the case with EU law, Cardwell and Hervey (n 17) 174. Yet, 
Örücü’s metaphors seem more open-ended and clearly far less unquestionable as to their nature. 
37 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (n 30) 174. 
38 In a more general view, we might argue that the literary model (which metaphorical expression follows) has a 
contribution to make to comparative law as one tool in the comparatist’s toolbox. See Eric Heinze, ‘The Literary 
Model in Comparative Law’ (2014) 9 Journal of Comparative Law 17, 27. 
39 However, it would be a mistake to think that any metaphor would work. It is clear that foreign legal texts 
cannot be freely interpreted or metaphorised because they present ‘a limited field of possible constructions’ as 
reminded by Paul Ricouer, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Forth Worth, Texas 
Christian University Press 1976) 79. 
40 Maksymilian Del Mar, ‘Thinking in Images in Legal Theory’, in Maksymilian Del Mar and Claudio Michelon 
(eds), The Anxiety of the Jurist (London, Routledge 2013) 43-57; 64. 
41 It is likely that metaphorical use of legal language is also ‘a potent constitutive mechanism for creating and 
sustaining communities, including legal communities’ as noted by Cardwell and Hervey (n 17) 157. 
 
Altogether, the use of metaphor in comparative law has many benefits of which some are 
even quintessential as to their nature.42 One of most crucial dimensions relates to the nature 
of comparative law research. Basically, comparative knowledge produced by the comparatist 
is typically relative as to its nature. This is to say that there is no certain knowledge but that 
the research results are well founded interpretations rather than fully objective scientific 
results.43 So, while using metaphors, comparatists have in fact revised the absolute 
knowledge claim of metaphors in the comparative study of law. Of course, recognition of the 
use of metaphorical language is also about accepting the interpretative character of 
comparative law research in general.44 If we accept this view, then, metaphors are strictly 
speaking non-scientific (as in an exact science) but at the same time are rather intrinsic to 
constitutive forms in constructing our hermeneutic knowledge of foreign legal systems.45 But 
to claim that metaphor is not scientific is not to undermine its value, on the contrary, because 
‘law is a major area in which reality is metaphorical’ as Gary Watt notes.46 
 
Along these lines, the function of metaphors is not really to explain the differences and 
similarities found in scholarship. Instead, it is to offer holistic projections that help 
comparatists to understand their subject matter and to make it easier for readers to grasp the 
essential message (in the form of mental images) which the comparatist seeks to convey. In 
other words, metaphor constructs a resemblance of two different objects relying on some 
common characteristics ie metaphor is comparison inside comparison. On balance, there is 
one significant problem when it comes to using these kinds of macro-comparative metaphors. 
It seems, I believe, that most or at least many readers will epistemically benefit from macro-
comparative metaphors by creating instant legal theoretical images when reading, but this is 
not necessarily so for all of the readers. In short, there may be readers who do not form such 
mental images naturally. And, of course, for such readers heavy reliance on metaphors may 
become dramatically counterproductive. Simply, not everyone visualises in the form of 
mental imagery and understands in the form of picture-like representations. Moreover, 
                                                             
42 Watt goes further and argues that ‘law as cultural ordering may be considered to be a reflection of the internal 
ordering of the mind’ Watt (n 32) 62. 
43 See for more detailed discussion, Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ (2015) 5 
Law and Method (available: <www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/RENM-D-14-00001>). 
44 See also John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’, in Mark Van Hoecke (ed.) 
Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2011) 155-176. 
45 See also Husa (n 7) 61 (discussing the scholarly nature of comparative law research). 
46 Watt (n 32) 63. 
metaphors may also confuse readers because they are necessarily imperfect as to their nature, 
ie they are able to cover certain aspects but certainly not all.47 Of course, this limitation 
concerns also Örücü’s metaphors. And, it goes without saying that failed metaphors end up 
obscuring things and prevent understanding as cognitive obstacles. Accordingly, Cicero’s 
ancient warning about the use of metaphor is good to bear in mind: ‘A metaphor is a short 
form of simile, contracted into one word; this word is put in a position not belonging to it as 
if it were its own place, and if it is recognizable it gives pleasure, but if it contains no 
similarity it is rejected.’48  It remains the responsibility of a comparatist to make sure that 
metaphor contains a sufficient degree of similarity or it will be rejected. 
 
One final thought. For most readers macro-comparative metaphors probably work well, but 
relying too extensively or too imaginatively on metaphors may be over the top, thus turning 
this otherwise useful comparative device into scholarly coquetting which nobody really 
benefits from. As the ancient carving in Apollo’s temple in Delphi says ‘nothing in excess’ – 
and that works well with the use of metaphors in comparative law too.49   
 
 
                                                             
47 As such this is perfectly normal and a part of the macro-comparative endeavour, see Husa (n 31). 
48 Cicero, De Oratore III 157, in AS Wilkins (ed), Libri de oratore tres (Oxonii (Oxford), E Typographeo 
Clarendoniano (Clarendon Press) 1902) (source: Perseus Digital Library, http://perseus.tufts.edu. ‘Similitudinis 
est ad verbum unum contracts brevitas, quod verbum in alieno loco tanquam in suo positum si agnoscitur, 
delectat, si simile nihil habet, repudiatur’. Cicero spoke of a chain of metaphorical words used to describe 
something as ‘a valuable stylistic ornament’ (De Oratore III 167; ‘magnum ornamentum orationis’). Yet, Cicero 
also cautioned the users of this ornament and warned them to avoid obscurity. 
49 In classical Greek upper case letters ‘ΜΗΔΕΝ ΑΓΑΝ’ (in lower case μηδὲν ἄγαν). For a short explanation, 
see Casper J. Kraemer, Jr., ‘ΜΗΔΕΝ ΑΓΑΝ: An Additional Note’ (1927) 22 Classical Philology 223. 
